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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3764 
_____________ 
 
 
DR. WILLIAM CARR, 
                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SUPERIOR COURT NEW JERSEY; 
NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY; PETER CONERLY; and COLLINS E. IJOMA  
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2-09-cv-00913) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 15, 2013 
 
 
(Filed: August 7, 2013) 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
 
 
____________ 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Dr. William Carr brought this failure-to-promote employment suit against his 
employers because he did not receive a second-round interview for the Essex Vicinage 
Chief Probation Officer (“CPO”) position in 2007. Carr claims racial discrimination 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(NJLAD), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and retaliation under Title VII and the NJLAD. He 
appeals the District Court’s grant of the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all 
counts. We will affirm.
1
 
Carr, an African American male who holds several professional licensures and 
advanced degrees in counseling and public administration, worked in probation for the 
New Jersey Judiciary for approximately thirty-five years. He became the Assistant Chief 
Probation Officer (“ACPO”) of Essex Vicinage in 2002, and held that position until his 
retirement. Defendant Peter Conerly became CPO of Essex Vicinage in 1999 and held 
that position until his retirement in 2007. He was Carr’s direct supervisor. Defendant 
Collins Ijoma, the Essex Vicinage Trial Court Administrator, provided administrative 
support and ensured compliance with the New Jersey Judiciary’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) Master Plan.  
                                                          
1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We apply de novo review for a summary 
judgment ruling. Azur v. Chase Bank, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). We determine 
whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Carr, the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
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Carr first applied for an ACPO position in 2000. He was not selected to interview 
and was told that he was not qualified for the position. Carr then instituted a failure-to-
promote employment discrimination suit against the New Jersey Judiciary and Conerly in 
federal court (“2000 lawsuit”). In 2002, with the 2000 lawsuit pending, he again applied 
for the ACPO position in Essex County and was promoted to the position. He voluntarily 
dismissed his suit,
2
 and later testified that he had “more experience” when he applied in 
2002. In 2005, Carr applied for two other positions—Family Division Manager and 
Assistant Trial Court Administrator/General Operations Division Manager—and received 
first-round, but not second-round, interviews for both. Conerly was on the Family 
Division interview panel and was the only panelist to recommend advancing Carr. The 
other panelists’ notes and score sheets indicate that Carr interviewed poorly and did not 
fully address the questions posed. For both positions, the panelists recommended only 
minority candidates to advance to the next rounds of the selection process. 
When Conerly intended to retire in 2007, Carr applied for Conerly’s CPO position 
after it was posted in December 2006. Carr and seven others were selected for interviews 
based on their experience and credentials in February 2007. Ijoma appointed the 
interview panel, which consisted of Conerly, James Agro, and Bob Sebastian. Having a 
minority on the panel is a “best practice” for the New Jersey Judiciary, but is not required 
under the EEO/AA Master Plan.  
                                                          
2
 Carr claims that Defendant Ijoma approached him in 2002 and intimated that, if Carr 
dropped the 2000 suit, he would be promoted to the ACPO position in Essex. Even if 
these facts were undisputed, they are not material to the issues in this case. 
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Interview performance provided the only basis for panelists to evaluate and score 
candidates. In their notes of Carr’s interview, the panelists uniformly expressed 
disappointment with his interviewing skills and his ability to apply his experience in 
answering the questions posed. The panelists similarly testified in depositions that they 
did not consider his background knowledge or experience in making second-round 
determinations, because he failed to incorporate this information in responding to 
interview questions. No evidence in the record suggests that Conerly informed the other 
panelists of Carr’s 2000 lawsuit during that process.  
Upon learning that he was not selected for a second-round interview and that a 
white male was selected for the position, Carr completed administrative complaint 
procedures with the New Jersey Judiciary and the EEOC. He then filed the present suit in 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
Following the Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the District Court granted 
judgment for the Defendants on all counts. With respect to Carr’s discrimination claims, 
the District Court determined that Carr established his prima facie case, and that the 
Defendants met their burden of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
not selecting Carr for a second-round interview: specifically, Carr’s poor interview 
performance. The District Court then concluded that, based on the record presented, Carr 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating pretext. With respect to Carr’s retaliation 
claims, the District Court concluded that, although Carr provided evidence showing that 
he engaged in a protected activity and then suffered an adverse employment action, he 
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failed to establish his prima facie case because he failed to show a causal link between 
the 2000 lawsuit and his lack of success in the 2007 interview process. 
Carr timely appealed. He raises before us the same arguments against summary 
judgment that he argued to the District Court. We conclude that these arguments fail to 
provide grounds for reversal. 
With respect to his discrimination claims, Carr challenges the District Court’s 
conclusion that he failed to adduce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to 
find pretext. Carr argues that the District Court failed to accord adequate weight to three 
facts which he raised in his effort to establish pretext, namely: 1) the notes of the 
interview panelists, including Conerly, did not consider Carr’s credentials or experience 
when making second-round interview determinations; 2) the Defendants’ failure to 
follow their “best practices” by not having a minority on the interview panel; and 3) the 
Defendants’ failure to follow the EEO/AA Master Plan by not adequately maintaining 
administrative records fully documenting the hiring processes for the positions to which 
he applied. These three facts, he claims, demonstrate pretext because they allow a fact 
finder to reasonably “either (1) disbelieve the [Defendants’] articulated legitimate 
reason[]; or (2) believe that an invidious . . . reason was more likely than not a . . . 
determinative cause of the [Defendants’] action.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Carr’s evidence presented no 
weaknesses, contradictions, or inconsistencies that would permit a reasonable jury to 
infer that the Defendants’ nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. It is undisputed that 
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the panelists’ scoring of candidates was based entirely upon candidates’ responses to 
interview questions; given Carr’s weak performance at this stage of the selection process, 
the panelists had no basis for considering the applicability or relevance of his experience 
or knowledge for the position. The panelists’ notes show that Carr’s first-round interview 
answers—responding to the same questions that were posed to all candidates—were off-
point, disjointed, rambling, and failed to draw upon and convey his relevant probation 
experience to the panelists. These notes, as well as the panelists’ deposition testimony 
confirming the same, are consistent with the Defendants’ nondiscriminatory explanation 
that Carr did not receive a second-round interview because he interviewed poorly and 
failed to apply his experience to the questions asked. Moreover, Carr does not proffer any 
evidence that contradicts the panelists’ accounts of his interview performance or the 
methodology for assessing interviewees for second-round interviews. That there is 
evidence that Carr interviewed similarly in at least one of his 2005 interviews further 
supports the Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasons. 
Additionally, contrary to Carr’s assertion that the Defendants did not follow “best 
practices” by having a minority as a panel member, Bob Sebastian testified at his 
deposition that he is Hispanic. Although his deposition testimony also reflects that 
Sebastian personally “did not consider himself to be on the panel as a minority,” 
Appellant Br. at 21, but rather because of his position as director of probation services, 
this does not negate the fact that Defendants complied with their “best practices.” 
Finally, as the District Court properly concluded, the recordkeeping failures in 
Essex Vicinage relating to the 2007 hiring process—specifically, that the Defendants 
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failed to keep, for the requisite three-year period, a file containing a list of candidates 
selected for interview, failed to retain information on the dates of first- and second-round 
interviews, and failed to have selection forms, interview questions, and selection criteria 
reviewed by all appropriate EEO/AA personnel—were not indicia of pretext since they 
had no bearing on the interview selection scoring procedures employed for selecting 
candidates for second-round interviews. Furthermore, Carr has adduced no evidence 
suggesting that the selection criteria and interview questions (which were the same for all 
candidates) were inherently unfair or discriminatory. 
Accordingly, the facts that Carr claims demonstrate pretext, when viewed in light 
of the entirety of the record, are insufficient to support such a conclusion. Because Carr 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating pretext, summary judgment in favor of the 
Defendants on Carr’s discrimination claims was proper. 
With respect to his retaliation claims, Carr urges that the District Court 
erroneously determined that he failed to adduce evidence establishing a causal link 
between the 2000 lawsuit and the 2007 interview. In light of the record, we agree with the 
District Court’s reasoning. 
 The District Court correctly determined that seven years between the lawsuit and 
interview was inadequate temporal proximity to independently support a causal 
connection. While Carr points to Conerly’s knowledge of the 2000 lawsuit, his presence 
on two interview panels that declined to recommend Carr, and Carr’s history of not 
advancing to second-round interviews as evidence of retaliatory animus, these facts are 
insufficient to establish a causal link. There is no evidence that suggests the other 
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panelists knew of the 2000 lawsuit at the time of the first-round interview, or that Conerly 
informed the other panelists about the 2000 lawsuit before or during the interview 
process, or that he somehow controlled or influenced the other panelists’ decisions. 
Indeed, the record shows that interview panelists completed evaluation forms and scoring 
independently prior to any discussion. As to Carr’s prior history as an interview 
candidate, Conerly was the only panelist in 2005 to recommend Carr for advancement in 
the Family Division Manager interview process.  
Carr also urges with respect to his retaliation claims that the District Court failed 
to accord adequate weight to the same three facts that he raised in support of his 
discrimination claims. However, he does not explain, nor is it clear to us based on the 
entirety of the record, how those facts establish the requisite causal link between his 2000 
lawsuit and his lack of invitation for a second-round interview in 2007. Carr fails to 
adduce any additional evidence suggesting a causal connection. Because Carr failed to 
establish a prima facie case for retaliation, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment for the Defendants on Carr’s retaliation claims.3 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the Defendants on all counts.
4
 
                                                          
3
 We also agree with the District Court’s determination that even if Carr made out his 
prima facie case for retaliation, he has failed to proffer evidence sufficient to rebut the 
Defendants’ non-retaliatory reason for not hiring Carr for the CPO position.  
4
 Because Carr’s NJLAD claims fail on the merits, we need not consider his additional 
argument that he is entitled to punitive damages under the NJLAD. 
